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23 April 1948

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Subject: Meeting of SANACC Subcommittee  
on Psychological Warfare

1. The SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare met at 0930 today in Mr. Hlock's office with the following members present:

Chairman - Mr. Ralph Hlock	- State Department
Comdr. David Knell	- Navy Department
Col. Clyde Rich	- Air Force
Col. William McNamee	- Army Department

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2. Upon my arrival it was obvious that the Subcommittee had been speaking about the CIA representative being made "official." Since this concept has come up on previous occasions I don't believe we need to spend any great inference to the conversation except perhaps that it might be tied in with the desire to make each member "official" before the subcommittee begins to move into "greener pastures" in its discussions and recommendations. Mr. Hlock then said that when I objected he would like to forward a memorandum on this subject to SANACC and insert an item in the minutes to this effect. I had no objection, but suggested that before he put this matter in the minutes he may want to glance at a copy of General Wright's memorandum of 22 April 1948. After a noisy blast of smiling surprise Mr. Hlock read aloud the memorandum and with last gasps from the members as to "why wasn't this done before?" a tombstone was placed on this sober subject.

3. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Air Judge Advocate have each prepared opinions on the legal problems involved in the establishment of the proposed NSIA. The Navy JAG said that the agency could not be brought into existence under present powers of the President, whereas the Air Judge Advocate stated that no additional authority is required. I suggested that it might be a good idea to forward these opinions formally through SANACC to NSC since the NSC staff is now considering the whole problem. The Subcommittee would not sanction such action and said that we should resolve the differences before sending any paper to SANACC. Commander Knell and Colonel Rich stated that under our coordinating function we could call in anyone, even representatives of the Attorney General. I contended that in our charter of operation to formulate proposed policies and functions for a psychological warfare agency I did not feel that we were established to pass on questions of law between departments. Mr. Hlock read parts of

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304/1 and 304/2 in an effort to support the contention of Commander Knoll and Colonel Rich but admitted that the passages did not quite hit this point. Though the Subcommittee members did not change their views they did decide to table the problem until a later date.

4. Mr. Block asked whether we should needle the Joint Chiefs of Staff to know what they have accomplished in the field of training for psychological warfare as recommended and approved in 304/6. The service members present did not like the idea of our Subcommittee using a needle on the Joint Chiefs and suggested that this question be held in abeyance until the receipt of NSC action on 304/12. The service members also stated that the JCS had referred the problem to the Joint Staff and that for training problems of all types the JCS has three officers covering the whole field.

5. Colonel McNamee asked the question as to what training is being conducted in CIA. I answered by indicating that training as mentioned in 304/6 covered Army, Navy and Air Force and said nothing whatsoever of CIA.

6. Mr. Block referred to Section 5 (g) and (h) of 304/6 and observed that the Army, Navy, Air Force and CIA representatives on the Subcommittee might be able to supply names of individuals who had worked on psychological warfare while in the service and in OSS just as he had prepared such a list of former OWI persons.

7. Colonel Rich was quite emphatic in his desire to "line up the people" immediately. He said that it was his desire to have the committee take up "emergency measures" without further delay and get the people who would fit into the different parts of the proposed organization which had been sent to the National Security Council.

8. Commander Knoll stated that the Subcommittee should formulate and recommend to the NSC a statement of policy on the use of psychological warfare as an instrument of national policy.

9. Again Colonel Rich insisted on getting the people "lined up" for the proposed organization. Mr. Block said that before we go further in ascertaining the resources and capabilities of the departments of government, we should first go into more detail to elaborate on the functions touched upon in the skeleton chart.

10. Colonel Rich stated that he could not see how the National Security Council can turn down the proposal which is now before them especially in view of the recommendation of the JCS. As we concluded the meeting he made the rather naive observation that with negative action on the part of the National Security Council "the Joint Chiefs can resign en masse."

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